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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Form and Flexibility of the International Tax Treaty System 
It hardly needs repeating that the existing income tax treaty system, designed to 
allocate countries’ taxing rights over profits from bilateral trade and investment, 
struggles under the weight of global economic integration. The evolution of the mode 
of transnational trade and investment – from single-state enterprises carrying on foreign 
business via branch operations to highly integrated multinational enterprises (‘MNEs’) 
– has disturbed the foundations upon which the current system of double taxation 
conventions (‘DTCs’ or ‘tax treaties’) are based.1 The transnational integration of 
business also creates opportunities for the unintended use or ‘abuse’ of tax treaties, 
particularly from the perspective of host states. 
 There is a tendency to think of the problems related to international taxation, 
and particularly international corporate taxation, as being recent. However, they have 
troubled policy-makers since at least the late 19th century. The period between the 
World Wars in particular saw an unprecedented expansion of international business and 
a corresponding crisis in international taxation, to which the initial model DTCs were a 
response.2 In 1992, several years before electronic commerce became a worldwide 
norm, Picciotto described the state of the then-current international tax regime as an 
‘increasing crisis’ which was in need of a ‘new approach’.3 As he observed at the time, 
much of this crisis has to do with the creation and manipulation of offshore statehood 
by internationally integrated firms; the well-advised MNE is able to exploit the loosely 
coordinated tax treaty system, often through the use of tax haven intermediaries, in 
                                                 
∗ Research Fellow, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation (geoffrey.loomer@law.ox.ac.uk). 
1 Two of the best critiques are: K Vogel, ‘Worldwide vs Source Taxation of Income – A Review and Re-
Evaluation of Arguments (Parts I–III)’ (1988) 8–9 Intertax 216, (1988) 10 Intertax 310, (1988) 11 
Intertax 393; and MJ Graetz, ‘The David R Tillinghast Lecture – Taxing International Income: 
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies’ (2001) 54 Tax Law Rev 261. 
2 ERA Seligman, Essays in Taxation (10th edn, MacMillan, New York 1925) ch 4; H Wurzel, ‘Foreign 
Investment and Extraterritorial Taxation’ (1938) 38 Columbia Law Rev 809. 
3 S Picciotto, International Business Taxation: A Study in the Internationalization of Business Regulation 
(Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London 1992) 67–68. 
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order to minimize its worldwide tax burden.4 While issues related to tax havens and 
treaty manipulation are not new, it is only recently that governments have come to 
appreciate the socio-political ramifications of such issues, rather than treating them as 
technical matters within the exclusive purview of tax professionals.5 
 Evidently verbs such as ‘exploit’, ‘manipulate’ and ‘abuse’ when applied to tax 
treaties express value judgements – they are words of conclusion rather than analysis. 
Among other commentators, Rosenbloom has stated that ‘abuse’ is a heavily loaded 
term: 
Not only is it derogatory; it implies that the proper use of tax treaties can 
be identified. Yet differences over precisely that point lie at the heart of 
the current discussion. Because the term suggests what is being discussed 
is a point of common understanding and agreement, when plainly it is not, 
the usefulness of the term is questionable.6 
Problems of terminology plague any theoretical analysis of tax avoidance behaviour, 
whether in the domestic tax law context or treaty context. The debate is muddled by the 
differing assumptions that underlie terms such as ‘unacceptable tax avoidance’, 
‘aggressive tax avoidance’ or ‘tax abuse’ in contrast to ‘acceptable tax avoidance’, ‘tax 
mitigation’ or ‘tax planning’.7 Nevertheless, there seems to be a widely held view that 
there exist some international tax minimization activities – even if it is difficult to 
delineate them – that are so inconsistent with the object and spirit of a treaty that they 
may reasonably be labelled ‘abuse’. 
 This paper explores the means by which tax authorities have sought to 
strengthen their tax treaties, through safeguards of varying nature and scope, in order to 
identify and prevent what they consider to be abuse of such treaties. Canadian and, to a 
lesser extent, British perspectives on treaty abuse are compared to international 
recommendations and the approaches of other states. In recent years Canada has moved 
beyond making exhortations to litigating cases where the Canada Revenue Agency 
(‘CRA’) believes that some abuse of a Canadian tax treaty has occurred. There is good 
reason to suspect that Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (‘HMRC’) have closely 
monitored the Canadian approach and would proceed similarly in a case of perceived 
abuse of a UK tax treaty. It will be seen that, while elements of the Canadian response 
                                                 
4 ibid 134–41. For a more recent exposition see S Picciotto, ‘Tackling Tax Havens and “Offshore” 
Finance’, Seminar on Money Laundering, Tax Evasion and Financial Regulation (Transnational Institute, 
Amsterdam 2007), available at <www.tni.org/crime-docs/picciotto.pdf> (accessed 25 February 2009). 
5 Picciotto 2007 (fn 4) 1–2. The Oxfam report Tax Havens: Releasing the Hidden Billions for Poverty 
Eradication (Oxfam Policy Paper, Oxford 2000) has helped raise the visibility of these issues in the 
United Kingdom. 
6 HD Rosenbloom, ‘Tax Treaty Abuse: Policies and Issues’ (1983) 15 Law & Policy in Int’l Business 
763, 766. 
7 For further discussion see J Freedman, ‘Interpreting Tax Statutes: Tax Avoidance and the Intention of 
Parliament’ (2007) 123 LQR 53. 
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have merit, to date it has been ineffective in curtailing tax treaty abuse. In the author’s 
view this failure is primarily due to the lack of critical inquiry into the essence of such 
abuse, in particular the lack of attempt to segregate the objective and subjective 
components of alleged abuse. 
1.2 Outline of Paper 
This working paper draws on more substantial research that comprises the author’s 
doctoral thesis (‘Thesis’),8 currently in progress. The paper briefly reviews the nature 
and purposes of bilateral tax treaties, which in broad terms serve to allocate fiscal 
jurisdiction so as to reduce the burden of double taxation. It is explained that the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’), the United 
Nations (‘UN’) and various states have identified ‘treaty shopping’ as a concern mainly 
because it violates reciprocity between treaty states. The typical but not exclusive 
pattern is where an entity established in a treaty state is used as a ‘conduit’ to route 
payments from the treaty partner to a third state. The paper examines the means by 
which various tax administrations worldwide seek to challenge conduit arrangements 
and other arrangements that they view as abusive, with particular focus on Canada and 
the UK. These means of challenge may be grouped under two headings. The first 
involves purposive approaches to treaty interpretation, particularly with respect to the 
terms ‘person’, ‘resident’ and ‘beneficial ownership’. The second comprises broader 
responses to unacceptable tax avoidance, specifically reliance on treaty anti-abuse 
principles and domestic anti-avoidance rules. The Canadian response is evinced by two 
recent cases in which the government unsuccessfully challenged ‘treaty shopping’ 
arrangements, MIL (Investments) SA v Canada9 and Prévost Car Inc v Canada.10 It is 
argued that the position advanced by the CRA in these cases was inadequate, largely 
because it conflated multiple approaches and failed to address directly a key concern: 
the presence or lack of genuine economic establishment in the treaty state. The paper 
concludes by suggesting that a more coherent response to this form of treaty ‘abuse’ is 
to identify by statute and treaty those circumstances in which a purported intermediary 
lacks genuine economic establishment – that is, residence – in the treaty state. 
                                                 
8 The Thesis analyzes the rationales for taxation of corporations on the basis of residence, the policy 
responses in the United Kingdom (‘UK’) and Canada to manipulation of offshore residence, and the 
tenuous connection between the rationales and responses. The goals of the Thesis are: (a) to demonstrate 
that a variety of policy responses to international tax avoidance often represent confused attempts to 
attack the reality of a corporation’s establishment in a state; and (b) to argue that a more coherent and 
intellectually honest response is to amend domestic laws and treaty provisions such that they are based 
on a substantive formulation of corporate residence. 
9 2006 TCC 460, affirmed 2007 FCA 236. 
10 2008 TCC 231, affirmed 2009 FCA 57. 
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2 THE USE AND ABUSE OF TAX TREATIES 
2.1 Background: The Nature of Tax Treaties  
As discussed in Chapter 2 of the Thesis, the primary concern in international income 
taxation is the resolution of competing jurisdictional claims between states of ‘source’ 
and ‘residence’, thus mitigating the burden of double taxation that would arise in the 
absence of international agreement.11 It is generally accepted that double taxation is 
undesirable and it is commonly presumed that alleviation of double taxation, whether 
unilaterally or through tax treaties, enhances transnational investment and global 
welfare.12 Most states, whether developed or developing, therefore seek to negotiate 
treaties with other states in order to divide and share tax jurisdiction on some mutually 
agreed basis. 
 The ideal would be to allocate income tax jurisdiction via some multilateral 
treaty based on universally accepted terms and concepts, particularly with respect to 
MNEs which by definition earn income across multiple states. Yet pleas for a 
multilateral agreement continue to seem utopian in the face of very real concerns over 
national sovereignty. Allocations of tax competence have in fact been achieved through 
a combination of unilateral statutory measures, bilateral tax agreements and nascent 
customary norms, producing an international tax consensus which Avi-Yonah aptly 
describes as a ‘flawed miracle’.13 It is estimated that there are over 2500 bilateral tax 
treaties now in existence,14 many of which exhibit a remarkable similarity in both 
structure and principle. This is not surprising given that most are based on the model 
conventions developed by the OECD15 and the UN,16 models which were themselves 
derived from earlier draft conventions produced by the League of Nations.17 Canada 
                                                 
11 Thesis ch 2 pp 18–21. 
12 These views are not universal. For alternative perspectives see: T Dagan, ‘The Tax Treaties Myth’ 
(2000) 32 NYU J of Int’l Law and Politics 939; RB Davies, ‘Tax Treaties and Foreign Direct 
Investment: Potential versus Performance’ (2004) 11 Int’l Tax and Public Finance 775. 
13 RS Avi-Yonah, ‘The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification’ (1996) 74 
Texas Law Rev 1301, 1303. 
14 BJ Arnold, J Sasseville and EM Zolt, ‘Summary of the Proceedings of an Invitational Seminar on Tax 
Treaties in the 21st Century’ (2002) 56 Bulletin for Int’l Fiscal Doc 233; A Schindel and A Atchabahian, 
‘General Report’ in Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International vol 90a ‘Source and Residence: New 
Configuration of Their Principles’ (Int’l Fiscal Association, Rotterdam 2005) 26. 
15 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (OECD, Paris 
2008) (‘OECD Model’). The OECD Model is accompanied by detailed Commentary (‘OECD 
Commentary’), which includes reservations expressed by various states. 
16 United Nations, Articles of the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed 
and Developing Countries (UN, Geneva 2001) (‘UN Model’). The UN Model is accompanied by 
detailed Commentary (‘UN Commentary’), building upon and sometimes differing from the OECD 
Commentary. 
17 The history of the model treaties is discussed in Thesis ch 2 pp 15–27. 
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has entered over 80 DTCs with both developed and developing nations,18 usually in the 
format of the OECD Model or the UN Model. This extensive network of tax treaties, 
among other factors, makes Canada one of the most globalized nations in the world.19 
 There are two principal purposes of tax treaties. The first is the aforementioned 
reduction or elimination of double taxation on transnational trade and investment; the 
second is the prevention of tax evasion through an open exchange of information 
between the Contracting States.20 Tax treaties have other subsidiary goals, including 
ensuring that residents are not subject to discriminatory tax treatment in foreign 
jurisdictions, establishing mechanisms for settling jurisdictional conflicts and other 
disputes, and providing certainty to residents regarding their potential tax liabilities 
abroad. For present purposes we will focus on the widely accepted primary goal of 
DTCs – reducing or eliminating double taxation. 
 This aim is achieved by a pragmatic but imperfect division of taxing rights 
between countries, premised on achieving some degree of national and transnational 
equity.21 In very broad terms, the international tax treaty system has evolved such that 
the primary right to tax income from foreign direct investment is given to the ‘source’ 
state while the right to tax income from foreign portfolio investment is awarded to the 
‘residence’ state. The incentive to engage in treaty shopping stems from the fact that 
the residence/home jurisdiction typically enjoys the dominant right to tax derivative or 
passive income, notably dividends, interest, royalties and most capital gains.22 This is a 
dominant but not exclusive right. Many countries do retain jurisdiction to tax dividends 
and interest (and occasionally royalties) at source by way of withholding taxes. 
                                                 
18 Canada has concluded comprehensive DTCs with 89 countries, excluding the former USSR; 87 of 
these are currently in force. Several treaties are under renegotiation or have been recently amended, 
including the Convention Between Canada and the United States of America With Respect to Taxes on 
Income and on Capital (1980) (‘Canada–US tax treaty’), which was amended by the Fifth Protocol to the 
Canada–US tax treaty (‘Fifth Protocol’) in September 2007. A complete list of Canada’s tax treaties is 
maintained by the Department of Finance at <www.fin.gc.ca/treaties-conventions/treatystatus_-eng.asp> 
(accessed 25 February 2009). 
19 A number of indices published by quasi-independent organizations support this observation, although 
one must be wary of political biases that may motivate such organizations. For example, the Kearney 
Globalization Index (AT Kearney/Foreign Policy, Chicago 2005–2007) has ranked Canada in the top 10 
for three years in a row, taking into account various factors including international treaties. 
20 P Baker, Double Taxation Conventions (loose-leaf, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007) [B.06]–[B.12]; 
OECD Commentary (fn 15) Art 1 para 7; UN Commentary (fn 16) para 2. 
21 See generally: NH Kaufman, ‘Fairness and the Taxation of International Income’ (1998) 29 Law & 
Policy in Int’l Business 145; RS Avi-Yonah, ‘International Tax as International Law’ (2004) 57 Tax Law 
Rev 483; K Brooks, ‘Inter-Nation Equity: The Development of an Important but Underappreciated 
International Tax Value’ in R Krever and JG Head (eds), Tax Reform in the 21st Century (Kluwer Law 
Int’l, forthcoming), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1292370>. 
22 OECD Model (fn 15) Arts 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) and 13(5); UN Model (fn 16) Arts 10(1), 11(1), 12(1) 
and 13(6). 
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Canadian income tax legislation imposes a 25 percent withholding tax23 on various 
amounts paid or credited to a non-resident person, including dividends, some forms of 
interest and most royalties.24 This tax is reduced to a nominal level where the recipient 
is a resident of a state with which Canada has concluded a tax treaty.25 The reduced 
withholding tax rate is often 5 percent for dividends paid to corporate shareholders with 
a substantial interest in the paying company, 15 percent for dividends paid to other 
shareholders, and 10 percent for interest and royalties. The dividends and interest 
articles in the Canada–UK tax treaty are representative: 
Article 10 – Dividends  
 
1.  Dividends paid by a company which is a resident of a Contracting 
State to a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that 
other State. 
 
2.  However, such dividends may also be taxed in the Contracting State of 
which the company paying the dividends is a resident and according to 
the laws of that State, but if the beneficial owner of the dividends is a 
resident of the other Contracting State the tax so charged shall not exceed: 
 
(a)  5 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends if the beneficial owner 
is a company which controls, directly or indirectly, at least 10 per cent of 
the voting power in the company paying the dividends; 
 
(b)  15 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends in all other cases. 
… 
Article 11 – Interest  
 
1.  Interest arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the 
other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State. 
 
2.  However, such interest may be taxed in the Contracting State in which 
it arises, and according to the law of that State; but if the recipient is the 
beneficial owner of the interest, the tax so charged shall not exceed 10 per 
cent of the gross amount of the interest. … 
 The Canada–UK tax treaty is, of course, based on the OECD Model. Many 
other Canadian tax treaties feature aspects of the UN Model, with the exception of the 
                                                 
23 Income Tax Act, RSC 1985 c 1 (5th Supp), as amended (‘Income Tax Act’) s 212. Following an 
announcement made in the 2007 Budget, section 212 was amended to eliminate withholding tax on 
interest payments made to arm’s length foreign lenders. 
24 The UK is more generous to inward investment in that withholding tax does not apply to dividends and 
is imposed on interest and royalties only in limited circumstances. UK taxation is further restricted by the 
Interest and Royalties Directive (2003), which provides for the elimination of host state taxation on 
interest and royalty payments between associated companies in different EU Member States. 
25 OECD Model (fn 15) Arts 10(2) and 11(2); UN Model (fn 16) Arts 10(2), 11(2) and 12(2). 
Geoffrey Loomer – OUCBT Working Paper 
Canada–United States tax treaty, which is based in part on the model convention 
developed independently by the United States (‘US’).26 The structure of the current US 
Model is substantially similar to that of the OECD Model but there are significant 
differences,27 notably the inclusion of the ‘limitation on benefits’ provision, discussed 
in section 4.2.1 below. Each model reflects different policy decisions on the allocation 
of jurisdiction between the home and host states. Thus the UN Model permits source 
taxation with respect to dividends, interest and royalties,28 while the US Model 
contemplates source taxation only for dividends – there is no provision for withholding 
tax on interest or royalties.29 These different allocations of taxing rights reflect the fact 
that the UN Model and the US Model are slightly more favourable to capital importing 
nations and capital exporting nations respectively. In any event, all model conventions 
and all tax treaties based upon them cede jurisdiction over some types of income to the 
residence state, thus making treaty state residence attractive. 
2.2 What is ‘Treaty Shopping’ and Why is it Considered a Problem? 
2.2.1 Treaty Shopping Described 
As with other international treaties, a tax treaty reflects a balance of advantages that is 
agreed to by the Contracting States when the treaty is negotiated. Treaty abuse, and in 
particular ‘treaty shopping’,30 is considered to occur where this balance is undermined 
by persons who are not resident in either Contracting State seeking treaty advantages 
that would not ordinarily be available to them. In 1987 the OECD published an 
influential report (‘OECD Conduit Report’) which addressed the use of tax treaties by a 
person ‘acting through a legal entity created in a State with the main or sole purpose of 
obtaining treaty benefits which would not be available directly to such person’.31 The 
                                                 
26 US Department of the Treasury, United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006 
(‘US Model’). The US Model has its own Technical Explanation: US Department of the Treasury, 
United States Model Technical Explanation Accompanying the United States Model Income Tax 
Convention of November 15, 2006 (‘US Commentary’). The US Model and US Commentary are both 
available at <www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/treaties.shtml> (accessed 3 March 2009). 
27 For analysis and comparison see RS Avi-Yonah and MB Tittle, ‘The New United States Model 
Income Tax Convention’ (2007) 61 Bulletin for Int’l Taxation 224. For analysis of earlier versions of the 
US Model see RL Doernberg and K van Raad, The 1996 United States Model Income Tax Convention: 
Analysis, Commentary and Comparison (Kluwer, The Hague 1997). 
28 UN Model (fn 16) Arts 10, 11 and 12. 
29 US Model (fn 26) Arts 10, 11 and 12. One of the most significant provisions in the Fifth Protocol to 
the Canada–US tax treaty is the elimination of withholding taxes on interest payments between residents 
of Canada and the US. Effective 2010 this exemption will apply whether or not the parties deal at arm’s 
length; thus it is more generous than the recent amendment to the Income Tax Act (see fn 23). 
30 There are other forms of treaty abuse, such as ‘rule shopping’, that need not involve establishment of 
corporate intermediaries. For further discussion see S van Weeghel, The Improper Use of Tax Treaties: 
with Particular Reference to the Netherlands and the United States (Kluwer, London 1998) 124–58. 
31 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, ‘Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit 
Companies’ in International Tax Avoidance and Evasion: Four Related Studies (OECD, Paris 1987) 88. 
The key points from this report are reiterated in the current OECD Commentary (fn 15), especially at Art 
1 paras 11–21. 
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UN in 1988 published its own report on treaty shopping (‘UN Treaty Shopping 
Report’), where it gave a substantially similar description of treaty shopping but, as we 
will see below, reached different conclusions about its acceptability.32 It is useful to 
illustrate the phenomenon via the following diagram: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In this example an enterprise resident in Bermuda wishes to make some 
investment in Canada, perhaps by acquiring shares or debentures of a Canadian 
company. Assume that the Bermudian enterprise will not deal at arm’s length with the 
Canadian company because they will be part of the same corporate group. There is no 
tax treaty between Canada and Bermuda, so if the Bermudian enterprise invested 
directly it would face the prospect of (a) Canadian capital gains tax on a subsequent 
disposition of the investment, and (b) Canadian withholding taxes on any dividends or 
interest payments it received. Instead the Bermudian enterprise makes use of a wholly-
owned entity in a convenient jurisdiction, here the Netherlands, to invest indirectly in 
the Canadian company. In the terminology of the OECD Conduit Report, the entity 
based in the Netherlands acts as ‘a conduit for channelling income’ from Canada to the 
ultimate recipient in Bermuda.33 The conduit entity is usually a corporation, but could 
be a partnership, trust or other entity having taxable status under the domestic law of 
the relevant state. The OECD Conduit Report observed that such an arrangement 
usually acts to the detriment of the source/host state because through the treaty it has 
ceded tax jurisdiction to the conduit’s purported state of residence. In this example the 
Canada–Netherlands tax treaty ensures that Canadian capital gains tax on a disposition 
of the Canadian shares is avoided (unless the value of the shares derives principally 
                                                 
32 UN, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Contributions to International 
Co-operation in Tax Matters: Treaty Shopping, Thin Capitalization, Co-operation between Tax 
Authorities, Resolving International Tax Disputes (UN, New York 1988). 
33 OECD Conduit Report (fn 31) 88. 
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from real property in Canada) and that Canadian withholding taxes on any dividends or 
interest are reduced,34 ignoring for the moment any anti-avoidance responses. Although 
these are the intended benefits of the treaty, they are effectively extended to persons to 
whom the treaty was not intended to apply. 
 Often the effectiveness of such a structure stems from the fact that the treaty 
benefits outweigh the corresponding taxes in the conduit’s purported state of residence, 
perhaps because the residence state has a preferential regime for certain businesses or 
imposes low rates of corporate tax. Some Canadian treaty partners which currently 
bestow tax preferences of this nature are Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and – an enduring favourite of Canadian tax planners – Barbados.35 In our 
example dividends or interest payments would flow from Canada to the Netherlands 
entity, which would in turn pay an equivalent or slightly lower amount to Bermuda. 
Assuming that the additional tax burden imposed by the Netherlands is sufficiently low, 
this arrangement will be more tax-efficient for the Bermudian enterprise than would a 
direct investment. The OECD Conduit Report categorized variations of this 
arrangement as ‘direct conduit strategies’ and ‘stepping stone strategies’. More 
complex arrangements involving multiple countries are also possible. Indeed, the 
deployment of a combination of intermediary entities through multiple treaty networks 
can reduce or eliminate taxation both at source and in each entity’s purported state of 
residence, while insulating the ultimate beneficiary from tax liability.36 
2.2.2 The Discontent with Treaty Shopping 
It might be argued based on the above example that Canada’s treaty with the 
Netherlands becomes a ‘treaty with the world’. This is precisely the view that was 
taken by the US Treasury in the early 1980s with respect to its tax treaty with the 
Netherlands, which the US believed was being exploited by non-residents worldwide to 
avoid US withholding taxes.37 Since that time the US has been at the forefront 
internationally in guarding its treaty network from abuse, as discussed in section 4.2.1 
below. Before a country is to implement a response to treaty ‘abuse’, however, it must 
ask itself why and how the arrangement described above is abusive. More specifically, 
                                                 
34 Canada–Netherlands tax treaty Arts 10(2), 11(2) and 13(7). 
35 The Canada–Barbados tax treaty, concluded in 1980, is attractive for a variety of reasons related to the 
treaty text, the domestic tax laws of Barbados, and provisions of the Income Tax Act dealing with 
foreign affiliates (Income Tax Act ss 90–95 and associated regulations). It is regularly relied upon for 
structuring investments into and out of Canada. The treaty is currently under renegotiation. 
36 Picciotto 1992 (fn 3) 135–41. 
37 It was common for non-residents to invest in the US through corporations set up in the Netherlands 
Antilles, an overseas possession of the Netherlands. At the time a protocol to the US–Netherlands tax 
treaty applied to the Antilles. A 1981 report by the US Treasury, Tax Havens and their Use by United 
States Taxpayers – An Overview (the ‘Gordon Report’), suggested that the US should consider 
terminating this treaty and other ‘tax-haven treaties’ in order to eliminate the potential for abuse. For 
further detail see: Rosenbloom (fn 6); van Weeghel (fn 30). 
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it must ask which variations of the above arrangement might be acceptable uses of the 
tax treaty and which variations might constitute abuse. 
 In the UN Treaty Shopping Report the term ‘abuse of tax treaties’ was defined 
loosely as ‘the use of tax treaties by persons the treaties were not designed to benefit, in 
order to derive benefits the treaties were not designed to give them’.38 The authors 
admit that this definition begs a number of questions, notably: Can we identify the 
persons whom a tax treaty is designed to benefit? This report differs from the OECD 
Conduit Report in that it recognizes there may be public benefits in allowing 
enterprises to structure their affairs so as to take advantage of tax treaties. For example, 
countries that are keen to attract inward investment may actively desire that dividends 
or interest paid to a recipient in a treaty jurisdiction be subject to low or no withholding 
tax, even if the recipient is a holding company for shareholders based elsewhere. The 
authors go on to say that, if one of the general objectives of tax treaties is to promote 
enhanced flows of international trade and investment, it is arguable that ‘it does not 
matter if the desirable result is achieved by the direct use of tax treaties or by their 
indirect use’.39 Other commentators start from the view that all taxes are distortionary 
and thus should be neutralized where possible within the legal limits of the 
international tax regime; they suggest that a distinction be drawn between ‘treaty 
routing’ – meaning legitimate reliance on a particular tax treaty – and the derogatory 
term ‘treaty shopping’.40 
 Little progress has been made since 1988 in expounding that nature of treaty 
abuse. The current OECD Commentary, which was substantially revised in 2003 to 
clarify (among other things) the organization’s views on this issue, states that it should 
not be ‘lightly assumed’ that a taxpayer has entered an abusive transaction.41 The 
Commentary sets out the ‘guiding principle’ that treaty benefits should be denied only 
where ‘a main purpose’ for an arrangement was to secure a more favourable tax 
position and where obtaining that favourable treatment ‘would be contrary to the object 
and purpose of the relevant provisions’.42 These elements will be described herein as 
the ‘subjective component’ and ‘objective component’ of treaty abuse, respectively. 
These two elements of treaty abuse have been expressed in slightly different terms by 
tax scholars,43 correspond to the international law doctrine of abuse of rights, and are 
                                                 
38 UN Treaty Shopping Report (fn 32) 2. 
39 ibid 6–7. 
40 eg LB Terr, ‘Treaty Routing vs Treaty Shopping: Planning for Multicountry Investment Flows under 
Modern Limitation of Benefits Articles’ (1989) 12 Intertax 524; MJ Langer, Practical International Tax 
Planning (3rd edn, Practising Law Institute, New York 1988) ch 1; P Tadros, ‘Caribbean Tax Treaties 
Create Unique Opportunities for Foreign Investment’ (2004) 36 Tax Notes Int’l 873. 
41 OECD Commentary (fn 15) Art 1 para 9.5. 
42 ibid. 
43 van Weeghel (fn 30) 117, 258; K Vogel, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions (3rd edn, 
Kluwer, The Hague 1997) 117. 
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usually embodied in the domestic anti-avoidance rules or principles of various states.44 
This expression of the elements of abuse seems reasonable enough, yet it is nebulous 
and requires further explanation, particularly with respect to the objective component. 
It is unclear whether the UN agrees that this should be the guiding principle for 
identifying treaty abuse.45 Moreover, various states and taxpayers are likely to have 
differing perspectives regarding which uses of a tax treaty are ‘contrary to the object 
and purpose’ of the relevant treaty provisions. 
2.2.3 Three Potential Problems 
Despite the possible advantages that some developing countries and many MNEs may 
recognize in the indirect expansion of treaty benefits, both the OECD and the UN have 
identified various reasons why treaty shopping (or ‘routing’) might be problematic.  
 The primary concern put forward in the OECD Conduit Report is that treaty 
shopping breaches the ‘principle of reciprocity’.46 In the typical conduit arrangement 
treaty benefits negotiated between two Contracting States are extended to third-country 
residents without that country having to make any concessions of its own. Taking 
Canada as the home country, its tax treaties are intended to provide benefits to residents 
of Canada and residents of the particular treaty partner on a reciprocal basis. The 
concern is that, if third-country residents are able to exploit Canada’s tax treaties to 
secure reductions in Canadian source taxation, the benefits would flow in only one 
direction: third-country residents would enjoy Canadian tax reductions for their 
Canadian investments, but Canadian residents would not enjoy reciprocal tax relief for 
their investments in that country. The OECD Commentary reiterates that treaty 
shopping fails to accord with the balance of advantages negotiated in the particular 
treaty.47 The UN characterizes this problem slightly differently, referring instead to 
distortions in the level and balance of income and capital flows between the treaty 
partners. 
 The second problem identified by the OECD is that treaty shopping 
arrangements may result in transnational income being exempted from taxation 
altogether or being subject to ‘inadequate taxation’.48 The OECD view is that 
Contracting States agree to sacrifice aspects of their tax jurisdiction with the 
                                                 
44 J Sasseville, ‘A Tax Treaty Perspective: Special Issues’ in G Maisto (ed), Tax Treaties and Domestic 
Law (Int’l Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Amsterdam 2006) ch 3 pp 57–58. 
45 The current UN Commentary merely quotes passages from the 1997 OECD Commentary, which 
reflects certain observations made in the OECD Conduit Report but lacks the analysis of the 2003 and 
2008 OECD Commentaries. The UN Commentary may soon be updated to incorporate recommendations 
of the Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, which met in 2005 and 2006 
to discuss a variety of issues including possible wording for treaty anti-abuse provisions. 
46 OECD Conduit Report (fn 31) 90. 
47 OECD Commentary (fn 15) Art 1 paras 8, 9, 11. 
48 OECD Conduit Report (fn 31) 90. 
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expectation that the other Contracting State will impose a reasonably comparable level 
of taxation. If a conduit entity is able to take advantage of deductions such that it brings 
its taxable income to zero in its state of residence, or is able to make onward payments 
to the ultimate investor with little or no additional taxation, then the treaty relief upon 
which it relies may extinguish all taxation. Put simply, the OECD view is that tax 
treaties are designed to prevent double taxation, not to create double non-taxation, a 
view which is reflected throughout the current OECD Commentary. This is a 
contentious proposition, however. Various commentators have argued that existing 
treaties based on the OECD Model and the UN Model cannot easily be seen as serving 
the objective of preventing double non-taxation.49 The UN Treaty Shopping Report 
suggested that, for developing countries, double non-taxation could very well be a goal 
of its tax treaties:50 developing countries that grant reliefs on inward investment may 
regard it as desirable that equal relief be granted in the other Contracting States in order 
to avoid frustration of their own reliefs. While this may be true, in the author’s view it 
does not mean that developing countries wish the tax advantages they provide to be 
exploited by persons who have no real economic connection with the developing 
country’s treaty partners. India in particular has been aggressive in challenging 
structures involving investments routed through its treaty partner Mauritius, in part 
because Mauritius imposes minimal taxation on foreign-owned investment entities.51 
Perhaps the most tenable position is that double non-taxation can potentially, but not 
automatically, be regarded as a basis for objection. 
 The final disadvantage of treaty shopping identified by both the OECD and UN 
is more convincing. This is the argument that treaty shopping destroys the incentive for 
countries to negotiate and conclude new treaties. In the typical conduit arrangement 
described above, the state where the ultimate investor is resident (Bermuda) has little 
incentive to enter treaties of its own when its residents can simply take advantage of 
other state’s treaty networks.52 Thus the practice is inconsistent with the laudable goals 
of enhanced global tax harmonization and inter-nation equity. In particular, tax haven 
states will continue to dwell outside treaty networks, depriving both developed and 
                                                 
49 M Lang, ‘General Report’ in Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International vol 89a ‘Double Non-Taxation’ 
(Int’l Fiscal Association, Rotterdam 2004) 73; BJ Arnold and S van Weeghel, ‘The Relationship between 
Tax Treaties and Domestic Anti-Abuse Measures’ in G Maisto (ed), Tax Treaties and Domestic Law 
(Int’l Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Amsterdam 2006) ch 5 pp 90–91. In MIL Investments, discussed 
below, the Federal Court of Appeal gave short shrift to the Crown’s argument that the tax treaty between 
Canada and Luxembourg should be interpreted so as to prevent double non-taxation: MIL Investments 
(FCA) (fn 9) para 8. 
50 UN Treaty Shopping Report (fn 32) 7. 
51 To date the Indian courts have not been sympathetic: Azadi Bachao Andolan v Union of India (2003) 6 
ITLR 233 (Supreme Court of India). The current Indian experience is analyzed in greater detail in GT 
Loomer, ‘The Vodafone Essar Dispute: Inadequate Tax Principles Create Difficult Choices for India’ 
(2009) Nat’l Law School of India Rev [forthcoming]. 
52 OECD Conduit Report (fn 31) 90; UN Treaty Shopping Report (fn 32) 7. The validity of this concern 
is demonstrated by the fact that several successful financial centres have few if any tax treaties, although 
some have entered Tax Information Exchange Agreements with the US: eg Bermuda, Cayman Islands 
and Liechtenstein. 
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developing nations of public funding that would otherwise be generated through 
taxation.53 
2.2.4 Relating the Alleged Problems to the Concept of Abuse 
Upon reviewing the problems said to be created by treaty shopping, it becomes 
apparent that each makes an implicit assumption that the entity established in the treaty 
state is somehow translucent, irrelevant or non-existent. It does not make sense to talk 
about a lack of reciprocity, the spectre of double non-taxation, or disincentives to future 
treaty negotiation if the entity’s independent existence and connection to the treaty state 
are recognized and if the income it receives is recognized as its own income. As 
between the source/host state where the investee entity is established and the treaty 
state where the direct investor is established, there is reciprocity, there is potential 
double taxation relieved by treaty, and there is fulfilment of the treaty objects. To 
conclude otherwise one must assume that the important relationship is the relationship 
between the source/host state where the investee entity is established and the third state 
where the indirect investor is resident, conceptually disregarding the direct investor. 
Pointing to the problems cited above does not greatly assist us in determining in what 
circumstances we should or should not make that conceptual leap. 
 The three highlighted problems suggest that, at least in the OECD’s view, a key 
factor is the intermediate entity’s lack of substance in the treaty state. Presumably this 
would be encapsulated in the objective component of the OECD’s guiding principle, in 
that these problems seem to constitute the very indicia of an arrangement being 
‘contrary to the object and purpose’ of the applicable treaty. One might query whether 
that is not sufficient for a finding of abuse. It is questionable whether the main purpose 
or purposes of a particular arrangement are of any relevance to the identified problems 
of lack of reciprocity, double non-taxation and disincentives to treaty negotiation. 
Rosenbloom correctly states that, while a focus on tax motivations may have its place 
in tax treaty policy, ‘important policy issues regarding the availability of treaty benefits 
can arise even when that state of mind is lacking’.54 Nevertheless, the OECD and those 
states that take a fervent stance against treaty shopping continue to focus on both the 
objective and subjective components, indicating that a tax avoidance purpose is 
considered critical. 
2.2.5 Canadian Perspective 
The CRA has stated on multiple occasions that it will challenge aggressive tax 
avoidance arrangements involving offshore entities, including ‘treaty shopping’ 
                                                 
53 Oxfam (fn 5); RS Avi-Yonah, ‘Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare 
State’ (2000) 113 Harvard Law Rev 1573, 1632–48. 
54 Rosenbloom (fn 6) 767. 
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arrangements.55 The Advisory Panel on Canada’s System of International Taxation 
(‘Advisory Panel’) has echoed the CRA view that ‘treaty shopping’ should be policed 
appropriately, although it made no specific recommendations on how to achieve this.56 
Unfortunately neither the CRA nor the Advisory Panel have clarified what they 
consider to be the characteristics of treaty shopping, other than to say that such 
arrangements seek to avoid tax on the disposition of Canadian property or to reduce 
withholding tax on outflows of dividends, interest or royalties. The difficulty with this 
description is that there are many legitimate investments made by non-residents which, 
by virtue of a tax treaty between Canada and the non-resident’s home country, will be 
immune to Canadian capital gains taxes or will face reduced Canadian withholding 
taxes – that is precisely what the treaty is intended to achieve. The CRA seems to 
emphasise the subjective component of treaty abuse, referring to a taxpayer 
establishing residence in a treaty state ‘in order to avail itself’ of treaty provisions ‘for 
tax avoidance purposes’. The difficulty of articulating the distinction between 
acceptable and abusive structures is probably what led the Advisory Panel to make no 
recommendations to government in this area.57 
 The point at which the legitimate use of tax treaties is considered to become 
abuse of tax treaties is perhaps best illustrated by examining the two challenges 
recently mounted by the CRA and Department of Justice. 
 MIL Investments58 involved a challenge to a tax planning strategy that relied on 
the Canada–Luxembourg tax treaty. An individual resident in Monaco owned all of the 
shares of MIL, originally established in the Cayman Islands, which in turn owned 
shares in a Canadian mining company (DFR). The DFR shares had significantly 
appreciated in value between 1993 and 1995. In order to avoid Canadian capital gains 
tax on a potential sale by MIL of the DFR shares, MIL was continued into Luxembourg 
in July 1995. Summarizing and eliminating many of the technical aspects of the 
arrangement, the DFR shares were subsequently sold to another Canadian mining 
group. MIL claimed an exemption from Canadian tax on the $425m capital gain by 
virtue of Article 13 of the Canada–Luxembourg tax treaty. It also paid no tax in 
Luxembourg by virtue of satisfying all requirements under the Luxembourg substantial 
shareholdings exemption. It is important to note that all shareholders of DFR, not just 
                                                 
55 CRA, Income Tax Technical News No 30 (21 May 2004) (a summary of issues discussed at the 2003 
Canadian Tax Foundation conference); CRA, Income Tax Technical News No 34 (27 April 2006) (a 
summary of issues discussed at the 2005 Canadian Tax Foundation conference). Both are available at 
<www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tx/tchncl/ncmtx/tnws3-eng.html> (accessed 3 March 2009). 
56 Advisory Panel on Canada’s System of International Taxation, Final Report: Enhancing Canada’s 
International Tax Advantage (Department of Finance, Ottawa 2008) (‘Advisory Panel Report’) paras 
5.61–5.68, available at <www.apcsit-gcrcfi.ca/index-eng.html> (accessed 3 March 2009). The Advisory 
Panel was established in 2007 to make recommendations to government for improving Canada’s system 
of international taxation. 
57 The Advisory Panel merely concluded that the federal government ‘should continue to monitor 
developments in this area’: ibid para 5.68. 
58 (fn 9). 
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MIL, sold their shares and that there were sound commercial reasons to do so. The 
Revenue nevertheless felt that the use of this structure for holding and disposing of the 
shares was a flagrant abuse of the Canada–Luxembourg tax treaty. 
 A more recent and internationally important decision is Prévost Car,59 which 
involved a direct conduit strategy very similar to those addressed in the OECD Conduit 
Report. Two companies, one based in Sweden and the other in the UK, had established 
a holding company in the Netherlands (PHBV) in order to hold shares in a Quebec-
based bus manufacturing company, Prévost Car Inc (Prévost). PHBV had no physical 
office or employees in the Netherlands or elsewhere and was managed by a Dutch 
advisory firm. Dividends paid by Prévost to PHBV were subject to the reduced 5 
percent rate of withholding tax under Article 10(2) of the Canada–Netherlands tax 
treaty. Substantially equivalent amounts were paid pro rata to the Swedish and UK 
shareholders, in accordance with a shareholders’ agreement, although PHBV was not 
contractually obliged to pay those dividends. There was no additional taxation in the 
Netherlands on the dividends paid to the ultimate shareholders. If PHBV had not been 
established and the dividends had been paid directly from Prévost to the Swedish and 
UK investors, the withholding rates would have been 15 percent and 10 percent 
respectively.60 According to the taxpayers, a Dutch holding company had been chosen 
for both tax and commercial reasons, including that the Swedish and UK investors each 
wanted to operate via a joint enterprise based in a ‘neutral’ country. The Revenue felt 
that the arrangement was abusive and sought to impose the higher rates of withholding 
tax under the Canada–Sweden tax treaty and Canada–UK tax treaty. 
 The specific legal responses of the Canadian government to these arrangements 
are discussed below in the context of other international responses to treaty abuse. 
None of the challenges were accepted by the Tax Court or the Federal Court of Appeal, 
who vindicated the arrangements, not because the arrangements were considered 
ethical or desirable from a tax policy perspective, but because Canada’s domestic laws 
and tax treaties dictated that result. It is likely that HMRC have closely monitored the 
Canadian approach, particularly in Prévost Car. The author has little doubt that the 
same result would be reached under UK tax law, although HMRC may insist otherwise. 
It may therefore be necessary for tax treaties negotiated by Canada and the UK to be 
more precise in the way they delimit those persons who are and who are not intended to 
benefit. The crucial question is how to achieve this objective without penalizing 
taxpayers whose reliance on a tax treaty is commercially legitimate and, more 
generally, without actively discouraging inward investment. 
                                                 
59 (fn 10). 
60 Canada–Sweden tax treaty Art 10(2); Canada–UK tax treaty Art 10(2). 
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3 CURRENT INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO TREATY ABUSE – 
INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES 
3.1 General Approach to Interpretation of Treaty Terms 
Tax treaties, like other treaties, have a dual nature. They are international agreements 
according to which sovereign governments agree to divide and share jurisdiction but 
they also become part of the domestic law of each Contracting State.61 This means that 
a tax treaty is simultaneously subject to the rules of interpretation in public 
international law and domestic tax law. There is a vast literature on the interpretation of 
tax treaties.62 As various scholars have implored in recent work, the rules of 
international law governing the interpretation and application of treaties, arising from 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’)63 and other 
sources of international law, are as much applicable to tax treaties as they are to any 
other type of treaty.64 It is sufficient for present purposes to observe that Canadian 
courts, along with courts in most other countries, accept that DTCs should be 
interpreted accordingly. 
 The leading domestic authority is the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Crown Forest Industries Limited v Canada.65 In that case Justice Iacobucci, speaking 
for the Court, observed that treaty terms should be given a liberal interpretation that 
best implements the true intentions of the Contracting States. This requires that due 
consideration be given to relevant model treaties, model commentaries,66 and the 
principles expressed in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. Of particular note 
is paragraph 1 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, which provides: 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose. 
                                                 
61 The incorporation of a treaty into domestic law happens either upon ratification or upon enactment of 
separate legislation, depending on the constitutional tradition of the specific country: Baker (fn 20) 
[F.01]; Vogel (fn 43) 24–25. In Canada and the UK separate legislation is required. 
62 eg Baker (fn 20) [E.01]–[E.35]; Vogel (fn 43) 32–51; DA Ward, ‘Principles to be Applied in 
Interpreting Tax Treaties’ (1977) 25 Can Tax J 263 (revised and reprinted in (1980) 34 Bulletin for Int’l 
Fiscal Doc 545); JF Avery Jones, ‘Interpretation of Tax Treaties’ (1986) 40 Bulletin for Int’l Fiscal Doc 
75; JS Hausman, ‘Interpreting Tax Treaties – A Canadian Perspective’ (2001) 55 Bulletin for Int’l Fiscal 
Doc 93; F Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (Int’l Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation, Amsterdam 2004). In Canada it is also necessary to consider the Income Tax 
Conventions Interpretation Act, RSC 1985 c I-4, as amended. 
63 [1980] Can TS No 37, available at <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/texts.htm>. 
64 Avi-Yonah 2004 (fn 21); Engelen (fn 62) ch 10. 
65 [1995] 2 SCR 802. See also Cudd Pressure Control Inc v Canada [1998] DTC 6630 (FCA). 
66 The Commentaries to the OECD Model are a widely-accepted guide to the interpretation of treaties 
based on that model, yet there is some uncertainty regarding the legal status of the Commentaries: Vogel 
(fn 43) 43–47; Engelen (fn 62) 439–73. 
Geoffrey Loomer – OUCBT Working Paper 
 Clearly this approach does not entail disregarding the text of the treaty. As 
Engelen observes, the basic assumption underlying Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention is that the treaty text is presumed to be the authentic expression of the 
intention of the Contracting States: ‘the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation 
of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into the subjective intentions of 
the parties’.67 Some terms used in a tax treaty will be clearly defined in the treaty itself, 
while others will be defined by reference to the domestic laws of the Contracting 
States. Article 3(2) of the OECD Model directs that any term not defined in the treaty 
shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the meaning that it has under the 
domestic law of the State applying the treaty. All of Canada’s tax treaties have a 
provision of this nature. It is important to note that the proviso ‘unless the context 
otherwise requires’ does not operate as some freestanding substance over form rule. 
Generally, the most appropriate domestic meaning of a term for the purposes of Article 
3(2) will be ascertained by reference to the context and purpose of the relevant 
domestic law, which may be insufficient to meet policy objectives that are peculiar to 
the treaty.68 
3.2 Interpreting Which ‘Persons’ are Entitled to Treaty Benefits 
3.2.1 Relevance of the Terms ‘Person’ and ‘Resident’ 
Article 1 of the OECD Model provides that the treaty in question ‘shall apply to 
persons who are residents of one or both of the Contracting States’. This is of vital 
importance because only those who are ‘persons’ and ‘residents’ of either Contracting 
State can establish that they are entitled to treaty benefits. Article 3(1) confirms that the 
term person includes a company. Article 4(1) provides that a resident of a Contracting 
State is ‘any person who, under the laws of that State, is liable to tax therein by reason 
of his domicile, residence, citizenship, place of management, place of incorporation, or 
any other criterion of a similar nature …’. The relevant articles of the UN Model and 
the US Model are substantially similar in these respects. All of Canada’s tax treaties are 
restricted in their application to persons who are residents of the relevant Contracting 
States, although the precise definition of resident varies from treaty to treaty. In 
virtually all of Canada’s treaties69 the determination of a person’s status as someone 
liable to tax by reason of residence or other factors will be made under domestic law. 
 The first implication of these provisions is that treaty benefits will be 
unavailable where an intermediate entity in a conduit arrangement is not a ‘person’. 
                                                 
67 Englen (fn 62) 541. 
68 For further discussion see: JF Avery Jones, ‘Article 3(2) of the OECD Model Convention and the 
Commentary to It’ (1993) 33 European Taxation 252; Vogel (fn 43) 206–16; Engelen (fn 62) 473–77; 
MN Kandev, ‘Tax Treaty Interpretation: Determining Domestic Meaning under Article 3(2) of the 
OECD Model’ (2007) 55 Can Tax J 31. 
69 A notable exception is the Canada–United Arab Emirates tax treaty, Article 4(1)(b) of which sets more 
rigorous conditions for an individual or company to qualify as a resident of the United Arab Emirates. 
Geoffrey Loomer – OUCBT Working Paper 
The OECD Conduit Report observed that an entity which is not a juridical person liable 
to tax in is own right, such as a partnership or other fiscally transparent entity, could be 
excluded from treaty benefits.70 In its more recent work on partnerships, the OECD has 
observed that even if a partnership is taxed as if it were a person under domestic law it 
cannot qualify as a ‘resident’ for treaty purposes.71 This view is reflected in the current 
OECD Commentary, is consistent with Canadian law, and is accepted by most other 
states.72 
 Further, Article 4(1) of the OECD Model excludes from the class of residents 
any person who is who is liable to tax in the Contracting State ‘in respect only of 
income from sources in that State…’. This provision ensures, among other aims, that 
branch operations of foreign enterprises cannot qualify as residents in their own right. 
In Crown Forest Industries, the critical issue was whether a Bahamas shipping 
corporation could claim the benefit of the Canada–US tax treaty as a ‘resident of the 
United States’ simply because the corporation had a place of management in the US. 
The Bahamas corporation filed income tax returns in the US but paid no tax there 
because it qualified as a foreign corporation exempt from US tax. The Court decided 
that the treaty was inapplicable, holding that a person must be liable to tax in a 
Contracting State on its worldwide income to be considered a resident under the treaty. 
More specifically, it was held that the criteria for determining residence in Article 4(1) 
‘entail being subject to as comprehensive a tax liability as is imposed by a state’.73 
3.2.2 The Shortcomings of this Approach 
Canada could rely upon these basic provisions to deny the application of one of its tax 
treaties where a third state resident purported to obtain treaty benefits via a partnership, 
branch or other fiscally transparent entity ‘located’ in the treaty partner state. The 
argument would be that the conduit was not actually established in the state and thus 
was not a resident entitled to treaty benefits. The difficulty is that any well-advised 
MNE seeking to exploit a state’s treaty network will take the steps necessary to ensure 
that it achieves residence status in that state. It will typically make use of an affiliated 
corporation, establishing formal residence in accordance with the corporate residence 
rules in the state’s domestic laws. 
 This practice is, of course, not difficult. The OECD Commentary observes that 
tax treaties generally do not concern themselves with the domestic laws of the 
Contracting States under which a person is to be treated as fiscally resident and, 
consequently, subject to comprehensive tax liability in that State. Nor do treaties set out 
                                                 
70 OECD Conduit Report (fn 31) 92. 
71 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to 
Partnerships (OECD, Paris 1999). 
72 OECD Commentary (fn 15) Art 1 paras 2–6.7. 
73 Crown Forest Industries (fn 65) para 40. 
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minimum standards which the provisions of domestic laws on residence have to meet. 
‘In this respect the States take their stand entirely on the domestic laws’.74 The UN 
Treaty Shopping Report observed that, while Article 1 of the UN Model delimits the 
range of persons that a tax treaty is designed to benefit, this limitation does not mean 
that the indirect advantages of a treaty will never extend beyond territorial boundaries, 
particularly to non-resident shareholders.75 Thus, while a tax treaty must be interpreted 
in good faith and in accordance with its text, context and purpose, such interpretation 
does not amount to a substance-over-form approach that a court could employ to 
disregard the separate legal personality and residence of a corporation under the 
relevant domestic law.76 
 As discussed in Chapter 4 of the Thesis, the domestic laws of the UK, Canada 
and most other Commonwealth jurisdictions determine corporate residence based on 
the formalistic tests of incorporation and ‘central management and control’. It is worth 
reiterating that, quite regrettably, neither standard denotes any substantial economic 
interest in the home state.77 The only circumstance in which a treaty-specific concept of 
residence becomes relevant is when a person is considered to be resident in both treaty 
states under their respective domestic laws. In such circumstance Article 4 of the 
applicable treaty generally sets out preference criteria (tiebreaker rules) for awarding 
residence to one Contracting State. In the case of corporations the preference criterion 
is usually ‘place of effective management’,78 a concept which may be more substantive 
than domestic formulations of corporate residence. Nevertheless, only a poorly-advised 
MNE is likely to engage in activities that would result in a conduit corporation being 
resident in both the intended residence state and the source state. In the normal course 
the fiscal residence of the conduit corporation would be determined solely by the 
domestic laws of the intended residence state. 
3.2.3 Canadian Perspective 
The view of the CRA regarding which persons are entitled to the benefits of Canada’s 
tax treaties is consistent with Crown Forest Industries and the OECD Commentary. 
According to the CRA, a person is considered liable to tax on the basis of residence if 
the person is subject to the most comprehensive form of taxation as exists in the 
relevant state.79 The CRA has conceded that it does not necessarily follow from this 
                                                 
74 OECD Commentary (fn 15) Art 4 para 4. 
75 UN Treaty Shopping Report (fn 32) 3. 
76 The potential application of treaty anti-abuse principles and domestic anti-avoidance rules is discussed 
in sections 4.2 and 4.3, below. 
77 Thesis ch 4 pp 30–47, particularly the discussion of Wood v Holden [2006] STC 443 (CA). 
78 OECD Model (fn 15) Art 4(3); UN Model (fn 16) Art 4(3). The Canada–US tax treaty is exceptional in 
that the preference criterion is place of incorporation. If a corporation subsists under the laws of both 
Canada and the US, dual residence is resolved by mutual agreement of the states’ Competent Authorities. 
79 Technical News 34 (fn 55); CRA, Income Tax Technical News No 35 (26 February 2007). 
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requirement that a person actually pays tax to a particular jurisdiction. For example, it 
may be that an entity is fully subject to the tax jurisdiction of a Contracting State but 
the domestic law of that state imposes low or nil rates of tax on such entities (such as 
pension funds) or on some forms of income (often capital gains). The CRA has 
expressed the following opinion: 
In these cases, the CRA will generally accept that the person is a resident 
of the other Contracting State unless the arrangement is abusive (e.g. 
treaty shopping where the person is in fact only a “resident of 
convenience”). Such could be the case, for example, where a person is 
placed within the taxing jurisdiction of a Contracting State in order to 
gain treaty benefits in a manner that does not create any material 
economic nexus to that State.80 
 This comment suggests that the CRA divines a distinction between residence 
and residence of convenience, with the distinction being made on the basis of the 
motives for establishment in the foreign state (‘in order to gain treaty benefits’) or the 
extent of the establishment in that state (‘material economic nexus’). While the overall 
tenor of this policy view is understandable, it tends to confound the objective and 
subjective components of treaty abuse. The author’s own view is that an appropriate 
method of addressing treaty abuse is to interrogate the economic reality of an entity’s 
nexus with a state, consistent with the second element of the CRA’s opinion above. Yet 
this will not be possible without significant changes in the definition and understanding 
of corporate residence. The fact remains that corporate residence will be determined 
according to the provisions of the domestic laws of the Contracting States, provisions 
which currently tend to be formalistic and not amenable to substance-over-form 
analysis. It is therefore not surprising that in MIL Investments and Prévost Car the 
Department of Justice did not seek to challenge the residence status of the respective 
holding companies. 
3.3 Interpreting ‘Beneficial Ownership’ 
3.3.1 Relevance of the Term  
It was noted above that the passive income articles in the OECD Model and the UN 
Model allocate tax jurisdiction to both the residence/home state and the source/host 
state, with limits set on source taxation where the ‘beneficial owner’ of the income is a 
resident of the other state. Thus, where a Canadian company pays dividends, interest or 
royalties to a non-resident investor, reduced withholding taxes will apply only if the 
recipient is the beneficial owner of the payment. This is a critical feature of tax treaties 
that may be relied upon by governments to prevent treaty advantages being accessed 
through some of the more blatant conduit arrangements. 
                                                 
80 Technical News 35 (fn 79). 
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3.3.2 History of the Term in Tax Treaties  
The concept of ‘beneficial ownership’ is employed in the OECD Model, other model 
conventions, and numerous tax treaties worldwide. The terms ‘beneficial owner’, 
‘beneficially owned by’ or ‘beneficially entitled’ appear in every one of Canada’s tax 
treaties.81 Yet prior to the Prévost Car decision there was no Canadian jurisprudence 
interpreting the beneficial ownership requirement in the treaty context. 
 Tax scholars have established that the first reference to this concept appeared in 
the 1966 protocol to the UK–US tax treaty, replacing an earlier requirement in the 
dividends, interest and royalties articles that the recipient be ‘subject to tax’ on the 
income in its state of residence.82 The term was also used in the Canada–UK tax treaty 
of 1966. The concept was adopted in the 1977 OECD Model and from there found its 
way into various countries’ tax treaties. Prior to the widespread inclusion of this term, it 
was possible for states to reach the same result by interpreting the terms ‘paid’ and 
‘received’ such that they referred only to the ultimate recipient of an amount.83 Thus, 
the US Tax Court in Aiken Industries v CIR held that interest payments made from a 
US corporation to a related Honduras corporation, where an equivalent amount of 
interest was paid onward to a related Bahamas corporation, were not actually ‘paid’ to 
the Honduran entity.84 The court considered that the Honduran entity did not have 
‘complete dominion and control’ over the funds. Thus the tax treaty exemption from 
US withholding tax did not apply. This decision, however, was influenced by anti-
avoidance doctrines that are peculiar to the US. The Canadian case MacMillan Bloedel 
Ltd v MNR demonstrates a very different approach.85 There the Revenue argued that 
interest paid on Canadian debentures to two nominees, a US firm of stockbrokers and a 
US bank, were not ‘received’ by the nominees but were in substance received by the 
beneficial owners of the interest. The Tax Review Board was not willing to read a 
‘beneficial ownership’ requirement into the (former) interest article of the Canada–US 
tax treaty. Instead it applied the treaty literally and allowed the reduced withholding tax 
rate on the interest payments. Under Canada’s current treaties, the express restriction of 
withholding tax relief to the beneficial owner of dividends, interest or royalties ensures 
a more satisfactory result. 
                                                 
81 Of Canada’s 87 tax treaties currently in force, 74 refer to beneficial ownership in the Articles for 
dividends, interest and royalties, while 13 refer to it only with respect to dividends (each of these was 
negotiated or last amended before 1985). The treaty with New Zealand is the only one that offers any 
explanation of the term, stating that ‘dividends, interest or royalties in respect of which a trustee is 
subject to tax in that Contracting State shall be treated as being beneficially owned by that trustee’. 
82 JF Avery Jones and others, ‘The Origins of Concepts and Expressions Used in the OECD Model and 
their Adoption by States’ [2006] BTR 695, 753–54. 
83 See van Weeghel (fn 30) 59–64. 
84 (1971) 56 TC 925 (USTC). 
85 (1979) 79 DTC 297 (TRB). 
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3.3.3 Conflicting Meanings  
The difficulty that has arisen with the interpretation of beneficial ownership in tax 
treaties is that there is no universally accepted meaning for the term. In particular, there 
is a tension between the common law meaning and what has been described as the 
‘international fiscal meaning’. 
 The OECD Conduit Report made reference to the original commentary to the 
1977 OECD Model, which explained that an agent or nominee would not qualify as a 
beneficial owner. The OECD Conduit Report added ‘conduit company’ to the list of 
potentially excluded persons, asserting that: 
… a conduit company can normally not be regarded as the beneficial 
owner if, though the formal owner of certain assets, it has very narrow 
powers which render it a mere fiduciary or an administrator acting on 
account of the interested parties (most likely the shareholders of the 
conduit company).86 
The UN Treaty Shopping Report similarly stated that a person would not be considered 
a beneficial owner if the person was ‘a mere nominee or agent’ or ‘a conduit company’ 
whose powers over assets were so narrow as to render it ‘a mere fiduciary or 
administrator’.87 These statements are not contentious insofar as a nominee, agent, 
fiduciary or administrator is by definition a nominal owner only – none would qualify 
as a beneficial owner under any understanding of that term. What is debatable is 
whether a ‘mere fiduciary or an administrator acting on account of the interested 
parties’ should encompass an intermediate corporation in a corporate group, despite 
having independent legal personality and exercising independent powers. Put another 
way, is a company that is substantially or wholly owned by another, and is therefore 
likely (but not obliged) to pay to its parent company any amounts received by way of 
dividends or interest, the beneficial owner of amounts it receives? Each state’s answer 
to that question will depend on how the term beneficial ownership is understood in its 
domestic law and on how its domestic approach to tax avoidance moderates that 
understanding in particular cases. 
 Given that its origins lie in the UK–US tax treaty and Canada–UK tax treaty, 
beneficial ownership is clearly a common law concept derived from the distinction 
between legal and equitable ownership.88 Lawyers working in common law systems 
might illustrate the distinction by pointing to the different rights and obligations of a 
trustee and beneficiary under a trust. A beneficial owner is distinguished from a mere 
legal owner by the fact that he, she or it can ultimately exercise the rights of ownership 
                                                 
86 OECD Conduit Report (fn 31) 93. 
87 UN Treaty Shopping Report (fn 32) 8. 
88 Avery Jones (fn 82) 747–54. 
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in the property.89 Yet the word ‘ultimately’ must be read with caution. A parent 
company is not the ‘beneficial owner’ of the assets of its subsidiary because a 
shareholder has no proprietary interest in the assets of a company. The concept is well-
established in common law legal systems and appears throughout UK and Canadian tax 
legislation. The OECD Commentary, however, endorses a different view. Drawing on 
the statements from the OECD Conduit Report quoted above, it states that the term 
beneficial owner is not used ‘in a narrow technical sense’.90 The Commentary suggests 
that the term should be accorded what Baker describes as an ‘international fiscal 
meaning’, not derived from the domestic laws of Contracting States.91 Part of the 
reason that the OECD takes this view is that most civil law jurisdictions do not 
recognize the duality of legal and equitable ownership. They are thus inclined to 
interpret beneficial ownership as ‘substantive’ or ‘effective’ ownership.92 Even among 
continental European states there is no general agreement as to the meaning of the 
term.93 Thus the OECD prefers an autonomous treaty meaning, independent of any 
domestic law. 
 The alleged international fiscal meaning of beneficial ownership was relied 
upon in Indofood International Finance Ltd v JP Morgan Chase Bank,94 a decision of 
the English Court of Appeal that has prompted a wave of negative commentary from 
international tax practitioners. The Indofood group, which is a large food production 
and distribution enterprise based in Indonesia, had borrowed money for use in its 
business. Rather than the Indonesian parent company issuing notes directly to investors 
and having them face a 20 percent withholding tax on the interest payments (for which 
Indofood was contractually liable), it had incorporated a special purpose company in 
Mauritius, which had issued the notes and on-lent the loan proceeds to the parent 
company. This structure resulted in the interest payments from Indonesia being subject 
to 10 percent withholding tax under the Indonesia–Mauritius tax treaty, with no 
additional tax on the interest payments from Mauritius to investors. All went well until 
Indonesia terminated its treaty with Mauritius because of perceived widespread abuse. 
The essential issue was whether the Indofood group could interpose a new company in 
the Netherlands to act as intermediary between the parent company and the Mauritius 
company. The intention was for interest payments to be made from Indonesia to the 
                                                 
89 Ayerst (Inspector of Taxes) v C & K (Construction) Ltd [1976] AC 167 (HL) 177; Jodrey Estate v 
Nova Scotia, sub nom Covert v Nova Scotia (Minister of Finance), [1980] 2 SCR 774, 784. For a detailed 
analysis see C Brown, ‘Beneficial Ownership and the Income Tax Act’ (2003) 51 Can Tax J 402. 
90 OECD Commentary (fn 15) Art 10 para 12, Art 11 para 9, Art 12 para 4. 
91 Baker (fn 20) [10B]–[14]. 
92 See for example the decision of the French Supreme Administrative Court in Bank of Scotland v 
Ministre de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, discussed at text to fn 138. 
93 C du Toit, Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in Bilateral Tax Treaties (Int’l Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation, Amsterdam 1999); JDB Oliver and others, ‘Beneficial Ownership and the OECD 
Model’ [2001] BTR 27. 
94 [2006] STC 1195 (Eng CA). 
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Netherlands, thence to Mauritius, and thence to the ultimate investors abroad. The case 
was before the English courts because the notes were governed by English law. 
 The success of this structure depended on the proposition that the Dutch 
financing company would be the ‘beneficial owner’ of the interest it would receive 
from the parent within the meaning of Article 11(2) of the Indonesia–Netherlands tax 
treaty. The Court of Appeal held unanimously that the Dutch company would not be 
the beneficial owner of the interest and thus the treaty relief would not apply. It reached 
this conclusion by considering how beneficial ownership would be understood by an 
Indonesian court, having regard to a circular published by the Indonesian Director 
General of Taxes on this issue, the Indonesian principle of substance over form in tax 
matters, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, and the interpretation of beneficial 
ownership suggested by the 2003 OECD Commentary. The Court refused to adopt a 
‘technical and legal’ approach, focusing instead on the commercial and practical reality 
of the arrangement.95 On that basis it decided that neither the Dutch company nor the 
Mauritian company would beneficially own the interest payments they received 
because neither would have the ‘full privilege to directly benefit from the income’.96 
 The Indofood decision caused concern among tax practitioners, who were quick 
to point out that the case is of no precedential value in the UK or Commonwealth.97 
This is because the case related to Indonesian law and, in any event, the relevant UK 
tax jurisprudence with respect to beneficial ownership was not put before the Court. In 
contrast, HMRC claim that the Indofood decision reflects an implicit anti-avoidance 
rule and that such an approach is consistent with the UK’s ‘existing policy’ against 
treaty shopping.98 It would appear that the CRA, at least until recently, agreed with this 
view. 
3.3.4 Canadian Perspective  
We noted above that in Prévost Car the government felt that the Swedish and UK 
investors had abused the Canada–Netherlands tax treaty by routing dividend payments 
through the Dutch holding company PHBV. Specifically, the CRA assessed on the 
                                                 
95 ibid para 44. 
96 ibid paras 42–44. The Chancellor also observed that the Dutch company would not be a resident 
entitled to the benefit of the Indonesia–Netherlands tax treaty because it would be ‘effectively managed’ 
from Indonesia, not the Netherlands. The other justices were skeptical about this opinion and preferred to 
decide the case solely on the beneficial ownership issue. 
97 eg R Fraser and JDB Oliver, ‘Treaty Shopping and Beneficial Ownership’ [2006] BTR 422; M 
McGowan, ‘Indofood Court Expands Interpretation of Beneficial Ownership’ (2006) Tax Notes Int’l 
1091. 
98 The HMRC International Manual was amended in October 2007 to state that the Indofood decision 
regarding beneficial ownership in the treaty context is ‘now part of UK law’: HMRC International 
Manual [332050], available at <www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/index.htm> (accessed 3 March 
2009). This view is criticized in R Fraser and JDB Oliver, ‘Beneficial Ownership: HMRC’s Draft 
Guidance on Interpretation of the Indofood Decision’ [2007] BTR 39. 
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basis that the ‘beneficial owners’ of the dividends paid by Prévost were the corporate 
shareholders of PHBV in Sweden and the UK, rather than PHBV itself. The 
Department of Justice, when arguing the case, did not deny that PHBV existed or that it 
qualified as a resident of the Netherlands. They argued instead that PHBV was a mere 
conduit company which exercised no real control over the funds it received from 
Prévost. In support of this they pointed to the shareholders’ agreement under which 
substantially all of the Prévost dividends were paid onward to the ‘ultimate’ corporate 
shareholders, as well as the fact that PHBV lacked any meaningful presence in the 
Netherlands. They submitted that the term ‘beneficial owner’ had no settled meaning in 
Canadian tax law and should be given an international fiscal meaning, an argument no 
doubt inspired by the decision in Indofood. 
 In some ways this argument was dead before it even began. First is the obvious 
fact that Canada, being a jurisdiction in the Anglo-Commonwealth legal tradition, has 
ample experience with the distinction between legal and beneficial ownership in 
domestic law. Moreover, Canada has publicly acknowledged in the context of the 
Canada–US tax treaty that the term ‘beneficial owner’ should be determined under the 
domestic law of the relevant Contracting State.99 Finally there is Article 3(2) of the 
Canada–Netherlands tax treaty which, consistent with the OECD Model, directs that 
undefined treaty terms shall have the meaning taken from the domestic law of the 
relevant State ‘unless the context otherwise requires’. The only way to escape the 
domestic law meaning of beneficial ownership would be to argue that the context 
otherwise requires, with ‘context’ interpreted broadly so as to incorporate other sources 
mentioned in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. Yet even if one took this 
approach it is not obvious how one would arrive at an ‘international fiscal meaning’ 
that serves an anti-avoidance purpose. It is therefore unsurprising that this argument 
found no favour in the Tax Court or Federal Court of Appeal. 
 The Tax Court in Prévost Car adopted the purposive approach to interpretation 
enunciated in Crown Forest Industries, having regard to the OECD Conduit Report, the 
2003 OECD Commentary, and Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, but failed to see 
how any of this could amplify the Canadian (or Dutch) meaning of beneficial 
ownership. Having considered extensive submissions and expert evidence on the 
matter, Justice Rip observed that one is the beneficial owner of income under Canadian 
                                                 
99 The US Treasury’s Technical Explanation of the Fifth Protocol to the Canada–US tax treaty (fn 18), 
available at <www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/treaties.shtml#canada>, states that the term ‘beneficial 
owner’ should be determined under the internal law of the host country in question. It implies that only 
nominees, agents and conduits would not be regarded as beneficial owners under the domestic laws of 
Canada and the US (pp 9–10). It goes on to say that prevention of treaty shopping is achieved not 
through an expansive interpretation of beneficial ownership but through express anti-abuse rules in the 
treaty or in domestic law (pp 51–61). Canada has acknowledged that it agrees with the Technical 
Explanation: Minister of Finance, News Release 2008-052 (10 July 2008), available at 
<www.fin.gc.ca/news08/08-052e.html>. Equivalent views are expressed in the US Treasury’s Technical 
Explanation to the UK–US tax treaty, available at <www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-
policy/treaties.shtml#uk>. 
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or Dutch law unless one is legally obliged to release the income to someone else. He 
concluded as follows: 
In my view the “beneficial owner” of dividends is the person who 
receives the dividends for his or her own use and enjoyment and assumes 
the risk and control of the dividend he or she received. … In short the 
dividend is for the owner’s own benefit and this person is not accountable 
to anyone for how he or she deals with the dividend income. When the 
Supreme Court in Jodrey stated that the “beneficial owner” is one who 
can “ultimately” exercise the rights of ownership in the property, I am 
confident that the Court did not mean, in using the word “ultimately”, to 
strip away the corporate veil so that the shareholders of a corporation are 
the beneficial owners of its assets, including income earned by the 
corporation.100 
Justice Rip reiterated that PHBV was a duly constituted legal entity carrying on 
corporate activity in accordance with Dutch law and that there was no ‘predetermined 
or automatic flow of funds’ from PHBV to its shareholders.101 Accordingly PHBV was 
held to be the beneficial owner of the dividends paid to it by Prévost and the 5 percent 
withholding tax rate was maintained. 
 The Federal Court of Appeal, in a brief judgment, dismissed the Crown’s 
appeal with costs. It could discern no error in the Tax Court’s factual findings or legal 
conclusions. Justice Décary observed that the broad interpretation of beneficial 
ownership advanced by the Crown ‘opens up a myriad of possibilities which would 
jeopardize the relative degree of certainty and stability that a tax treaty seeks to 
achieve’.102 He further stated that the Crown seemed to be urging the Court ‘to adopt a 
pejorative view of holding companies which neither Canadian domestic law, the 
international community nor the Canadian government’ have adopted.103 
 It appears that, following the decision in Prévost Car, there has been some 
consideration given to establishing a more substantive definition of beneficial 
ownership for Canadian tax treaty purposes. Whether this would be achieved through 
blanket legislation or via renegotiation of individual treaties is unclear. The Advisory 
Panel reported in 2008 that submissions made to them indicated ‘that it might be best to 
wait for a globally agreed definition before taking unilateral action in this regard’.104 
                                                 
100 Prévost Car (TCC) (fn 10) para 100. 
101 ibid paras 102–103. 
102 Prévost Car (FCA) (fn 10) para 15. 
103 ibid. 
104 Advisory Panel Report (fn 56) para 5.66. 
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4 CURRENT INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO TREATY ABUSE – 
APPLYING ANTI-AVOIDANCE PRINCIPLES AND RULES 
4.1 Overview of Anti-Avoidance Approaches 
The limited efficacy of the interpretive approaches reviewed above suggests that, if a 
state wishes to exercise greater control over who may use its tax treaties, it should 
endeavour to include express statements to that effect within its treaties. Existing treaty 
provisions of this nature fit into two categories: those that look at objective factors 
relating to the qualities of the person seeking treaty benefits; and those that consider the 
subjective intentions of the person seeking treaty benefits. Such provisions are often 
referred to as ‘limitation on benefits’ or ‘limitation of benefits’ articles.105 
Alternatively, a state may advance the view that a principle prohibiting treaty abuse is 
inherent in all of its tax treaties, without requiring expression in the text. Each of these 
avenues may be characterized as the invocation or implication of a treaty anti-abuse 
principle. A quite distinct approach is for a state to have recourse to its domestic anti-
avoidance laws to counter tax treaty abuse. In practice, several states including Canada 
have sought to rely on a combination of such approaches, with varying degrees of 
success. 
4.2 Invoking or Implying Treaty Anti-Abuse Principles 
4.2.1 Express Limitation on Benefits Articles 
The UN Treaty Shopping Report concluded that it was not possible to say as a general 
rule that provisions prohibiting treaty abuse should be a standard feature of tax treaties. 
The UN view is that it is for each state to consider the probability and extent of any 
abuse and to weigh that against the economic benefits of the treaty left unguarded.106 
This view is reflected in both the OECD Model and the UN Model, neither of which 
includes express anti-abuse provisions. It remains the case that a few of the largest 
developed nations, notably the US, the UK and Germany, have independently made 
policy decisions to incorporate express limitation on benefits articles in their tax 
treaties. 
 The US has been vigilant in guarding its treaty network from abuse since the 
introduction of its own model convention 30 years ago. The US holds strongly to the 
view that its tax treaties should include express provisions preventing unintended 
access by residents of third countries.107 This is achieved by the very detailed limitation 
                                                 
105 FA Vega Borrego, Limitation on Benefits Clauses in Double Taxation Conventions (Eucotax Series 
on European Taxation, Kluwer, The Hague 2006). 
106 UN Treaty Shopping Report (fn 32) 19. 
107 US Commentary (fn 26) Art 22; Doernberg and van Raad (fn 27) 172–73. 
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on benefits rules in Article 22 of the US Model.108 In general, the provision does not 
rely on an analysis of subjective motives but instead sets forth a series of objective tests 
to determine whether a person has a sufficient economic nexus with a Contracting State 
to warrant treaty benefits. The Article delineates who is a ‘qualified person’, which 
includes resident individuals, certain publicly traded companies and certain other 
companies for which at least half of the voting shares are owned by qualifying persons. 
Qualification according to any of these criteria entitles the person to treaty benefits. A 
resident who is not a ‘qualified person’ may nevertheless be entitled to treaty benefits 
with respect to an item of income derived from the source state if the resident ‘is 
engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business’ in the residence state (other than 
certain investment businesses) and the income is derived in connection with that trade 
or business. The US view is that ‘Article 22 effectively determines whether an entity 
has a sufficient nexus to the Contracting State to be treated as a resident for treaty 
purposes’.109 Wheeler confirms that limitation on benefit provisions are an ‘entity test: 
they test the strength of the connection between the person claiming benefits and the 
residence state in which he does so’.110 In effect, the US limitation on benefits article 
introduces more substantive restrictions on fiscal residence than exist under most 
states’ domestic laws. 
 Other states that employ limitations on benefits have done so less rigorously. Of 
particular interest are the treaties negotiated by Germany and the UK. In the case of 
Germany, Article 29(6) of its tax treaty with Canada provides as follows: 
Nothing in the Agreement shall be construed as preventing a Contracting 
State from denying benefits under the Agreement where it can reasonably 
be concluded that to do otherwise would result in an abuse of the 
provisions of the Agreement or of the domestic laws of that State.111 
A very similar provision appears as Article 29A(7) of the Canada–US tax treaty, 
supplementing the express limitation on benefits rules. Thus treaty benefits can be 
denied under these two treaties where allowing the benefits would constitute an ‘abuse’ 
of the treaty provisions. This approach would arguably take account of both objective 
and subjective elements. The UK prefers to include rules denying particular treaty 
benefits where a person involved in an arrangement has a dominant tax avoidance 
purpose. The dividends article of the Canada–UK tax treaty contains the following 
representative exclusion: 
                                                 
108 In the Canada–US tax treaty this appears as Article 29A. The provision was added to the treaty in 
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The provisions of this Article shall not apply if it was the main purpose or 
one of the main purposes of any person concerned with the creation or 
assignment of the shares or other rights in respect of which the dividend is 
paid to take advantage of this Article by means of that creation or 
assignment.112 
There are similar exclusions for dividends, interest, royalties and other income in many 
newer UK tax treaties.113 This is now a common UK treaty provision and has gained 
wider acceptance in the OECD Commentary.114 One reason that the UK and other 
European Union member states may prefer to rely on purpose-based limitations, rather 
than entity-based limitations as employed by the US, could be a concern not to breach 
freedom of establishment under the EC Treaty.115 
 The difficulty with applying a ‘main purposes’ test or other subjective test for 
abuse is that, as noted in the UN Treaty Shopping Report, it is ‘a notoriously difficult 
business’ to show that arrangements have been entered into for the main purpose of 
benefiting from a treaty.116 The UN therefore encouraged the use of objective tests 
instead. Canada, in contrast, appears to favour the type of ‘main purposes’ test 
employed by the UK: it has negotiated equivalent provisions in a handful of Canadian 
tax treaties recently concluded with smaller countries, including those with Mexico, 
Oman and Peru. In any event, there are as yet no judicial decisions on disqualification 
from Canadian tax treaty benefits under an express limitation on benefits article, 
whether objective or subjective.117 It is likely that the structures used in MIL 
Investments (discussed in section 4.2.3 below) and Prévost Car would have collapsed 
under a US-style limitation on benefits provision because, among other things, the 
                                                 
112 Canada–UK tax treaty Art 10(7). 
113 eg the UK’s tax treaties with Australia, Denmark, Korea, New Zealand, Oman and Saudi Arabia. The 
tax treaties concluded with France and the Netherlands in 2008 (not yet in force) contain provisions of 
this nature, replacing the current language: ‘…mainly for the purpose of taking advantage of this Article 
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114 OECD Commentary (fn 15) Art 1 para 21.4. 
115 This is an enormous topic in its own right. For further discussion see Vega Borrego (fn 105) ch 4; CH 
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on European Taxation, Kluwer, The Hague 2007) ch 5. An analysis of purpose-based limitations on the 
use of controlled foreign companies is contained in Thesis ch 5. 
116 UN Treaty Shopping Report (fn 32) 8, 17–18. 
117 The issue did not arise in Crown Forest Industries because the then-current version of the Canada–US 
tax treaty did not contain a limitation on benefits article. 
Geoffrey Loomer – OUCBT Working Paper 
controlling shareholders of the treaty entities were not residents of the relevant treaty 
state. One can only speculate whether these decisions would have been different had 
the respective tax treaties contained purpose-based anti-treaty shopping provisions, 
although the observations made in MIL Investments suggest that the outcomes would 
have been the same. 
4.2.2 Implied Anti-Abuse Principles  
Some jurisdictions take the view that a principle prohibiting treaty abuse is inherent in 
all of their tax treaties, obviating the need to express such a principle through a 
limitation on benefits provision. This argument derives from public international law, 
particularly Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, which provides that a treaty ‘shall be 
interpreted in good faith’, and Article 26 thereof, which provides that every treaty ‘is 
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith’ (pacta sunt 
servanda).118 It is said that the obligation to interpret and perform a treaty in good faith 
creates an autonomous ‘abuse of law’ principle with respect to tax treaties, similar to 
the domestic doctrines applied by some states.119 The OECD Commentary entreats 
Contracting States to interpret and apply tax treaties in accordance with the ‘guiding 
principle’ mentioned previously, suggesting this is sufficient to disregard abusive 
transactions without recourse to express restrictions or domestic anti-avoidance 
rules.120 The OECD recognizes, however, that not all states share this view. There is a 
reasonable argument that the principle of good faith in the interpretation and 
application of tax treaties relates solely to the good faith of the Contracting States, not 
of taxpayers who seek to rely on the treaty.121 
 A notable example of this approach is the decision of the Swiss Bundesgericht 
(Federal Supreme Court) in A Holding ApS v Federal Tax Administration.122 As in 
Prévost Car, the case involved an international flow of dividends through special 
purpose companies. An individual resident in Bermuda was the sole shareholder of a 
Bermuda company, which in turn owned a Guernsey company, which in turn owned a 
Danish holding company, which in turn owned 100 percent of the shares of a Swiss 
operating company. It was claimed that dividends distributed by the Swiss company to 
the Danish entity were exempt from Swiss source taxation by virtue of the 
Switzerland–Denmark tax treaty. The Danish holding company had no assets or 
employees and its only activity was to receive and pay dividends. It was accepted that 
                                                 
118 van Weeghel (fn 30) ch 7; Engelen (fn 62) ch 6; N Goyette, ‘Tax Treaty Abuse: A Second Look’ 
(2003) 51 Can Tax J 764, 765–75. 
119 See section 4.3 below. 
120 OECD Commentary (fn 15) Art 1 paras 9.3–9.5, addressed at text to fn 41–42. 
121 Engelen (fn 62) 124–28, citing B Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International 
Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge 1953, reprinted 1987) 106–36. 
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the holding company was a resident of Denmark for purposes of Danish law and that it 
took beneficial ownership (albeit briefly) of the Swiss dividends. The issue was 
whether these dividends could be denied the treaty exemption from Swiss withholding 
tax on some other basis. The Switzerland–Denmark tax treaty did not have an express 
anti-abuse principle, unlike some Swiss tax treaties, and the Swiss domestic tax 
avoidance legislation did not apply to this situation. The Supreme Court nonetheless 
decided that, by virtue of international law, all Swiss tax treaty provisions must be 
interpreted so as to prevent abuses of the treaty. It considered this arrangement to be 
abusive and therefore denied the treaty relief claimed. 
4.2.3 Canadian Perspective  
The few Canadian tax treaties that contain express anti-abuse principles appear to have 
been designed that way at the insistence of the other Contracting State, notably the US 
and Germany. The Canadian tax treaties that are most often exploited in treaty 
shopping arrangements, such as those with Barbados, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, have no such rules. The question becomes whether those treaties should 
be read as containing an implied anti-abuse principle, similar to the approach of the 
Swiss Supreme Court in A Holding ApS. In 2003 the CRA expressed the view that, 
where it identified cases of treaty abuse, it would seek to deny benefits through two 
related approaches:123 it would rely on an inherent principle against the abuse of treaties 
and would also challenge the arrangement under Canada’s general anti-avoidance rule 
(‘GAAR’).124 Both of these approaches were advanced in MIL Investments. 
 As explained previously, MIL Investments involved a complex series of 
transactions that resulted in no taxation in Canada (or Luxembourg) on a significant 
capital gain realized on the disposition of shares in the Canadian company DFR. One of 
the arguments made by the Crown was that the exemption under Article 13 of the 
Canada–Luxembourg tax treaty could be denied on the basis of an anti-abuse rule 
inherent in the treaty. Justice Bell analyzed the relevant provisions of the Vienna 
Convention, the OECD Commentary applicable at the time the treaty was concluded, 
and the context and purpose of the relevant treaty provisions. None of this persuaded 
him that the ‘carefully negotiated treaty’ should be read as including an implied anti-
abuse rule.125 In any event, he considered that ‘the shopping or selection of a treaty to 
minimize tax on its own cannot be viewed as being abusive’.126 Thus it seems unlikely 
that, had the treaty contained an express provision against abuse similar to Article 29(6) 
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of the Canada–Germany tax treaty, it would have been applied by the Court in this 
case. 
 One might complain that Justice Bell’s analysis was very traditionalist and out 
of step with current international tax thinking. Among other things, he refused to 
consider revisions to the OECD Commentary published later than the conclusion of the 
Canada–Luxembourg tax treaty and seemed to insist that there be an ‘ambiguity’ in the 
treaty before looking to its broader context and purpose.127 Nevertheless, the 
government’s appeal with respect to the GAAR (discussed below) was dismissed and 
there is no reason to believe that the Federal Court of Appeal would have disturbed the 
Tax Court’s conclusion with respect to the alleged treaty anti-abuse principle drawn 
from international law. It is therefore unremarkable that the Department of Justice did 
not seek to imply a treaty anti-abuse principle when it argued Prévost Car the 
following year. 
4.3 Invoking Domestic Anti-Avoidance Rules 
4.3.1 Consistency with Treaty Obligations  
Perhaps the most common approach to countering treaty shopping, aside from pursuing 
arguments about a lack of beneficial ownership, is to rely on a state’s internal laws 
prohibiting abusive tax avoidance. A threshold issue is whether the application of 
domestic anti-avoidance rules to international treaties is permitted under international 
law. As this issue is now largely academic in Canada it will be addressed only briefly 
here. 
 There are various domestic approaches to abusive tax avoidance. The US 
employs judicial doctrines known as ‘economic substance’, ‘step transaction’ and 
‘substance-over-form’ to disregard transactions motivated predominantly by tax 
considerations.128 The legal systems of several European states, including France, 
Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands, incorporate doctrines regarding abuse of 
law and abuse of rights, both of which are deeply rooted in civil law traditions; these 
doctrines are known variously as abus de droit, fraude à la loi, Rechtsmissbrauch and 
fraus legis.129 In some of these jurisdictions general principles preventing abuse of law 
are buttressed by express provisions in domestic tax legislation. The UK prefers to deal 
with aggressive tax avoidance through ordinary statutory interpretation.130 The tradition 
in developed Commonwealth countries, including Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
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South Africa, is to rely on a statutory GAAR. While GAARs differ in their wording and 
scope, the common theme of such provisions is to deny a tax advantage where: (a) the 
main or primary purpose of a transaction or series of transactions is to obtain such tax 
advantage; and (b) the relevant tax provisions relied upon to achieve that advantage 
have been abused, having regard to their context and purpose.131 Evidently this 
formulation is similar to the guiding principle that the OECD suggests be used for 
identifying treaty abuse. 
 The OECD Commentary favours the view that domestic anti-avoidance rules do 
not have to be expressly incorporated in tax treaties in order to condition the 
application of treaties. The Commentary on this issue was substantially expanded in 
2003 and 2008 but unfortunately the analysis is somewhat meandering, perhaps 
because it attempts to fuse a wide variety of national perspectives. In essence, the 
OECD argues that taxes are imposed by domestic law and are merely relieved by 
treaties, thus an abuse of the provisions of a tax treaty would also be an abuse of the 
provisions of domestic law under which the tax is levied.132 The OECD concludes that 
there is no conflict between domestic anti-avoidance rules and tax treaties. 
 Some commentators have argued that the views expressed in the OECD 
Commentary are unsound. They believe that a state which adopted the OECD position 
would be engaging in a unilateral treaty override, possibly amounting to a breach of 
international law.133 The UN Treaty Shopping Report queried whether the denial of 
treaty benefits by virtue of domestic anti-avoidance laws ‘is compatible with the 
denying State’s obligations under the treaty’. They observed that, if in any particular 
case it was decided that the treaty permitted the abusive relief to be given, the treaty 
partners would then have to consider renegotiating the treaty so as to deny similar relief 
in the future.134 The opposing view is that a state’s domestic tax laws and a state’s 
international tax treaties must be interpreted concordantly; this will of necessity involve 
application of anti-avoidance rules in addition to other domestic tax provisions.135 
4.3.2 Approaches of Other Jurisdictions  
In any event, for many states it appears to be a matter of international custom (if not 
international law) to agree reciprocally that their respective anti-avoidance regimes 
                                                 
131 D Pickup, ‘In Relation to General Anti-Avoidance Provisions: A Comparative Study of the Legal 
Frameworks Used by Different Countries to Protect Their Tax Revenues’ in J Freedman (ed), Beyond 
Boundaries: Developing Approaches to Tax Avoidance and Tax Risk Management (Oxford Univ Centre 
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132 OECD Commentary (fn 15) Art 1 paras 9.1–9.2, 22–22.2. 
133 eg Baker (fn 20) [F08]–[F10]; Doernberg and van Raad (fn 27) 173; Arnold and van Weeghel (fn 49) 
92–98. 
134 UN Treaty Shopping Report (fn 32) 10. This was the conclusion reached by the Indian Supreme Court 
with respect to the India–Mauritius tax treaty in Azadi Bachao Andolan (fn 51). 
135 Goyette (fn 118) 778–805. 
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may be invoked to counter tax treaty abuse. For example, the Canada–Germany tax 
treaty expressly incorporates the domestic anti-abuse provisions of the respective 
states.136 The US Commentary takes it as given that US limitation on benefits 
provisions work in conjunction with domestic anti-avoidance rules.137 This position is 
supported by the tax jurisprudence of other states as well. 
 As already noted, the English Court of Appeal opined in Indofood that the 
Indonesian principle of substance over form, drawn from its domestic tax law, could be 
relied upon to amplify the interpretation of ‘beneficial ownership’ in the Indonesia–
Netherlands tax treaty. A similar conclusion was reached by the French Conseil d’ Etat 
(Supreme Administrative Court) in the Bank of Scotland case.138 There an American 
company had entered a usufruct agreement with a UK bank, under which the bank 
acquired dividend coupons relating to the shares of a French subsidiary of the US 
parent. The Court concluded that treaty benefits were not available to the UK bank 
under the France–UK tax treaty because ‘le bénéficiaire effectif’ (the effective 
beneficial owner) of the dividends was the US parent company. The Court appears to 
have been influenced by the French doctrine of abus de droit. Thirdly, the Del 
Commercial Properties case139 is an application of US economic substance principles 
to a tax treaty. The US Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Tax Court, held 
that certain loan repayments purportedly made from a US corporation to a Dutch 
intermediary were in substance made to the ultimate Canadian lender and were 
structured to avoid US withholding taxes. The Courts applied the American step-
transaction doctrine under which a series of formally separated steps may be collapsed 
and treated as a single transaction. 
4.3.3 Canadian Perspective  
Canadian tax treaties other than those with Germany and the US do not expressly 
incorporate Canadian anti-avoidance rules. The absence of such provision in Canada’s 
other tax treaties is no longer of concern, however. A retroactive amendment to the 
GAAR enacted in 2005 ensures that the GAAR applies not only to an abuse of the 
Income Tax Act, but to an abuse of the Income Tax Regulations, the Income Tax 
Application Rules and each of Canada’s tax treaties.140 While the retroactive scope of 
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the amendment may be deplored,141 Canadian courts have accepted that the amendment 
is effective to make the GAAR, at least in principle, applicable to tax treaty abuse.142 
 The GAAR was introduced in 1987 in response to what the government viewed 
as the excessive formalism of Canadian courts with respect to tax avoidance. There is a 
large literature with respect to the GAAR which cannot be discussed in any detail 
here.143 It is sufficient to review the key features of the GAAR and the prevailing 
judicial attitude towards its interpretation and application. 
 In broad terms, the GAAR may be relied upon to deny a tax benefit that would 
be obtained through an ‘avoidance transaction’ or through a series of transactions that 
includes an ‘avoidance transaction’. An avoidance transaction is a transaction that, but 
for the GAAR, would result in a tax benefit, unless it ‘may reasonably be considered to 
have been undertaken or arranged primarily for bona fide purposes’.144 Even if these 
conditions are satisfied, the tax benefit will be denied only if the transaction would 
result in a ‘misuse’ or ‘abuse’ of provisions of the Income Tax Act, a tax treaty or 
certain other instruments not relevant here.145 There have been approximately 30 
decisions that have considered the GAAR. The determinative issues have in most cases 
been the presence or absence of bona fide motivations for a transaction and the 
identification of a transaction as legitimate or abusive in the context of specific 
provisions of the Income Tax Act. 
 The Supreme Court of Canada had opportunity to elucidate the meaning of the 
GAAR in two recent cases, Canada Trustco Mortgage Co v Canada146 and Mathew v 
Canada.147 In each case the Court, having dealt briefly with the concepts of ‘tax 
benefit’ and ‘avoidance transaction’, adopted the following two-stage framework to 
determine if an avoidance transaction results in an abuse of the Income Tax Act. A 
court must first interpret the provisions giving rise to the tax benefit to determine their 
object, spirit and purpose, employing an approach that is at once textual, contextual and 
purposive. It must then determine whether the impugned avoidance transaction 
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frustrates that object, spirit or purpose. Importantly, the Supreme Court insisted that the 
GAAR is not an overriding ‘economic substance’ test – it requires a rigorous analysis 
of the individual transactions in the context of the specific provisions relied upon. The 
Court opined that abusive tax avoidance exists: 
… where the relationships and transactions as expressed in the relevant 
documentation lack a proper basis relative to the object, spirit or purpose 
of the provisions that are purported to confer the tax benefit, or where 
they are wholly dissimilar to the relationships or transactions that are 
contemplated by the provisions.148 
In the author’s view this formulation sets an inordinately high threshold for a finding of 
abuse, depriving the GAAR of any substantial impact beyond that which could be 
achieved through ordinary statutory interpretation. The potential deficiency in this 
formulation of the GAAR is apparent when the provision is applied to the exploitation 
of a tax treaty.149 
 The Crown in MIL Investments argued that the taxpayer had abused the capital 
gains exemption under Article 13 of the Canada–Luxembourg tax treaty, with the result 
that the tax benefit should be denied pursuant to the GAAR. There is no doubt that 
there were valid commercial reasons for the individual shareholder to cause MIL to sell 
the DFR shares; the question was whether the method chosen to implement that sale 
comprised at least one avoidance transaction that frustrated the purpose of the treaty. 
Justice Bell considered the framework from Canada Trustco and referred to various 
Canadian decisions recognizing the legitimacy of tax planning in the course of 
commercial arrangements. His primary conclusion was that none of the impugned 
transactions (including the continuance from Cayman to Luxembourg) was an 
avoidance transaction. While accepting that one of the ‘driving forces’ of the 
transactions was to ensure the sale of the DFR shares in a tax effective manner, he 
concluded that the overall commercial purpose was sufficient to exculpate the 
transactions.150 He nevertheless went on to consider whether, had one or more of the 
transactions been an avoidance transaction, it would have constituted an abuse of the 
tax treaty. Given the high threshold established in Canada Trustco, it is unsurprising 
that Justice Bell came to the conclusion that there was no abuse. Indeed, his view was 
that ‘the shopping or selection of a treaty to minimize tax on its own cannot be viewed 
as being abusive’.151 He held that a court must examine ‘the use of the selected treaty’ 
rather than its selection. From there he turned to the text of the specific treaty 
provisions relied upon. He could discern no reason why those provisions should not 
apply to a Luxembourg holding company owned by a foreign shareholder. 
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 The Federal Court of Appeal agreed, saying it was clear that: (a) the Canada–
Luxembourg tax treaty intends to exempt Luxembourg residents from taxation on gains 
from the disposition of certain Canadian property; and (b) under the terms of the tax 
treaty, the shares of DFR held by MIL were such exempt property. The Court held that, 
if the exempting provision was intended to be limited to portfolio investments, or to 
non-controlling interests in immoveable property, then ‘it would have been easy 
enough to say so’ in the tax treaty.152 
 The CRA and Department of Justice may fear that this interpretation of the 
GAAR amounts to its annihilation so far as treaty shopping is concerned. This may be 
why the GAAR was not invoked in Prévost Car as an alternative to the beneficial 
ownership contention. The analysis in section 2.2 above demonstrated that, while it 
may be difficult to delimit which uses of a treaty will be considered legitimate or 
abusive, it is the very selection of a particular treaty by unintended beneficiaries in 
which the abuse subsists. Yet the analysis in MIL Investments indicates that one must 
focus on the particular mechanics by which the treaty provisions operate, rather than on 
the selection of that treaty by particular beneficiaries. The analysis in MIL Investments 
seems to ensure that any avoidance strategy involving a Canadian tax treaty, no matter 
how blatant, will be immune to the GAAR provided the intermediate entity is formally 
established in the particular state and meets the technical requirements of the particular 
treaty provisions relied upon. 
5 CONCLUSION – TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE CANADIAN RESPONSE 
5.1 The Canadian Response in Context 
Numerous states around the world, both developed and developing, have encountered 
the problem of unintended beneficiaries exploiting their tax treaty networks. Different 
states have responded to treaty shopping in different ways, based on their individual 
perceptions of the scope and severity of the problem and based on their individual legal 
traditions. Canada has targeted aggressive international tax planning, including treaty 
shopping, but to date has been unsuccessful before the courts. These results might be 
welcomed by some MNEs, high net worth individuals and their international tax 
advisors, on the view that the arrangements in MIL Investments and Prévost Car (and 
indeed Indofood) were legitimate and deserved to be vindicated. Yet if the Canadian 
government believes that arrangements of this nature are antithetical to Canadian tax 
treaty policy, it must query how it can effectively forestall such arrangements without 
discouraging bona fide investment. 
 One should first consider why the arguments advanced by the CRA and the 
Department of Justice have failed. In Prévost Car, the challenge hinged upon the court 
accepting an interpretation of beneficial ownership borrowed from international fiscal 
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law and scholarship. Aside from the obvious problem that this approach ignored the 
domestic legal meaning of the term, it was tantamount to using ‘beneficial ownership’ 
as a surrogate anti-avoidance rule. Moreover, the position advanced in Prévost Car 
attempted to relate beneficial ownership to the holding company’s degree of presence 
in its jurisdiction of residence, thereby conflating distinct issues. Such an approach is 
not likely to succeed in any Anglo-Commonwealth legal system, where beneficial 
ownership has an established meaning and where tax avoidance rules are carefully 
circumscribed. Even jurisdictions that have an anti-avoidance ethos which is more 
favourable to the domestic tax authorities, such as Switzerland and the US, have 
countered dividend conduit arrangements not by extending the concept of beneficial 
ownership but by invoking treaty anti-abuse principles or domestic anti-avoidance 
rules.153 The arguments advanced in MIL Investments were more tenable than those in 
Prévost Car. However, the Canadian courts are not yet willing to accept that the 
decision to establish an affiliate in a particular state is in itself abusive, whether under 
an implied treaty principle or the GAAR. It seems inevitable that, in a legal system 
characterized by liberalism, the overall commercial purpose of investing abroad will 
generally be considered sufficient to justify the particular structure employed. 
 Given these constraints it appears that there are three possibilities open to the 
Canadian government. The first option would be to terminate specific tax treaties 
considered most susceptible to abuse, which would be a radical and possibly counter-
productive action. A preferable avenue would be to renegotiate specific tax treaties so 
as to include express anti-abuse rules, limiting treaty benefits to an intended class of 
beneficiaries. A related and more fundamental response would be for Canada and other 
interested states to reconsider their formulations of corporate residence.  
5.2 Including Express Anti-Abuse Principles in Canadian Treaties 
One viable option is to include express anti-abuse principles in Canadian tax treaties, 
preferably using objective rather than subjective assessments. Provisions that seek to 
deny benefits where there is ‘abuse’ (as in the Canada–Germany tax treaty) or where 
the beneficiary has a tax avoidance ‘main purpose’ (as in the Canada–UK tax treaty) 
are vague and are unlikely to be fruitful given the decision in MIL Investments. It 
would be more effective to incorporate objective rules in the form of US-style 
limitation on benefits provisions, in conjunction with current or enhanced beneficial 
ownership requirements. 
 It was not until 2007 that the US limitation on benefits provision was made 
reciprocal, thus permitting Canada to deny treaty benefits to US conduit entities.154 
Canada would do well to renegotiate its other tax treaties to include provisions of this 
nature, as they ensure that only residents with a substantial economic nexus in the 
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treaty partner state can enjoy the benefits of the treaty. The ‘substance’ of that 
economic nexus could be determined based on objective factors, such as the proportion 
of shares ultimately held by residents of the treaty partner state or the degree of 
business activity carried on in the treaty partner state. The factors chosen would 
determine whether the tax structures used in MIL Investments, Prévost Car or other 
variations would or would not be barred from treaty entitlements. For example, 
requiring a majority of ultimate individual shareholders to be resident in the treaty 
partner state would completely undermine the avoidance arrangements employed in 
both Canadian cases and most other conduit structures envisaged by the OECD and 
UN. If Canada believes that it is appropriate to add a subjective element they could do 
so. Which factors to adopt is a policy decision – the important point is that control over 
the use of Canada’s international agreements would be restored to Canada and its treaty 
partners, rather than being in the domain of MNEs and their international tax advisors. 
5.3 Reconfiguring Corporate Residence 
A more fundamental response, which in the author’s view is a corollary to express 
limitation on benefits provisions, is to seek to reconfigure the law of corporate 
residence through legislative amendment. In attacking treaty shopping arrangements, 
what tax authorities are essentially challenging is the perceived abuse that arises from a 
person’s lack of connection with the Contracting State through which it seeks to obtain 
treaty benefits. This is stated plainly in the US Commentary,155 is implicit in the OECD 
Conduit Report and OECD Commentary,156 and is evident from the arguments made in 
various treaty shopping cases, including Prévost Car, Indofood and A Holding ApS. 
Each case involved a letter box company (or companies) having no physical offices, 
staff or productive business. Tax authorities generally do not waste effort challenging 
the residence of conduit entities because there is little chance of success under most 
domestic laws. In Canada and many other jurisdictions the determination of residence 
is made based on place of incorporation or place of central management and control. 
The author has argued previously that both concepts fail as measures of a substantial 
economic nexus.157 Implementing a US-style limitation on benefits provision in a tax 
treaty represents a partial recognition of this failure. More comprehensive recognition 
is possible. Redefining what Canada considers to be ‘residence’ and ‘non-residence’ – 
in its domestic law and its tax treaties – would be a rational, effective and transparent 
way of addressing international tax treaty abuse, without hindering foreign direct 
investment into Canada. 
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